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Legal Practitioners’ Negligence Liability for Claim Investigation 
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18 October 2011 
 
It is without doubt that solicitors owe their clients a duty to take reasonable care in carrying out the 
terms of their retainer.
1
 Recently, in Nigam v Harm (No 2), this duty was considered in the context 
of a solicitor’s liability to a former client for an alleged failure to advise them that a possible 
medical negligence claim had a reasonable prospect of success.  Accordingly, this case sheds light 
on the obligations of legal practitioners to properly investigate the existence, and merits, of causes 
of action proposed.  In doing so, it also highlights the potential for judicial discretion and 
divergence, both in the application of principles and evidence relevant to tests of causation, and in 
the assessment of damages for the loss of a chance of securing civil compensation.   
 
Facts 
The respondent, over many years, had suffered from various gynaecological and other problems, 
including intermittent stabbing pain on the right-hand side of her stomach for which she initially 
consulted Dr Hastwell (a gynaecologist) in May 1990.  A retroverted uterus, congestion and 
possibly endometriosis were diagnosed as the cause
2
 and the doctor subsequently performed a 
diagnostic laparoscopy and a ventrosuspension of the uterus in February 1992.  Following the 
surgery the respondent experienced pain in the right iliac fossa,
3
 and Dr Hastwell then arranged for 
her to undergo an appendectomy in May 1992.  Although the respondent assumed this would be 
performed laparoscopically, the appendectomy was instead performed through an extended 
Pfannenstiel incision.
4
  Postoperative examination of the appendix found it to be normal. 
 
After this second surgery, the respondent alleged that she suffered from severe unabated pain from 
the area of the incision which was caused by Dr Hastwell’s negligence, and in September 1997 
‘retained the appellant to investigate and advise on the merits of an action for damages.’5  To 
prevent the action from becoming statute-barred in February 1998,
6
 a writ was issued against the 
doctor.  However, the writ was never served, nor was an application made to extend its validity 
pursuant to O7 r1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971.  Rather, the respondent accepted the 
appellant’s advice that this should not occur ‘until the appellant had conducted further enquiries into 
the claim and obtained medical evidence to support it.’7  Ultimately, the action became statute-
barred. 
 
The respondent, therefore, commenced proceedings against the appellant for negligence in failing to 
properly investigate the merits of her claim and in failing to keep the action alive.
8
  She alleged that 
she had thereby lost the chance of prosecuting a claim against Dr Hastwell.  The appellant argued 
that, ‘consistent with the respondent’s instructions,’ it had not taken steps to either serve the writ or 
extend its validity ‘because on the material reasonably available to it the claim had no reasonable 
prospect of success.’9 
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 The right-inferior part of the surface of the abdomen. 
4
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Decision at Trial
10
 
Scott DCJ found the appellant negligent in not making further enquiries as to whether the 
appendectomy was necessary. His Honour also held that the appellant had breached his duty of care 
by not advising the respondent that there was an arguable cause of action on the basis that: 
1. if necessary, the appendectomy should have been performed laparoscopically (and not by 
Pfannenstiel incision);  
2. Dr Hastwell had failed to warn the respondent of the risk of nerve entrapment associated 
with a Pfannenstiel incision; and  
3. the nerve entrapment following the second surgery caused her continuing pain. 
 
Consequently, in those circumstances the appellant was also negligent in not taking steps to prevent 
the respondent’s claim against the doctor becoming statute-barred. For, ‘had the respondent been 
offered the chance to pursue an action against Dr Hastwell she would have taken it.’11  Damages of 
$200,000 (representing 40% of the amount the plaintiff was likely to recover if successful at a 
notional trial, or the loss of a 40% chance of claiming against the doctor), were then awarded. 
 
Decision on Appeal 
The appellant appealed against both liability and assessment of damages.  The respondent cross-
appealed, arguing that the assessment of damages at 40% was ‘so low as to be beyond the limits of 
a sound discretionary judgment.’12  
 
In relation to the general duty of care owed by the appellant in investigating the merits of a client’s 
claim and advising them on it, the Court confirmed that the starting point in determining a 
solicitor’s negligence was scope of their retainer. 
[I]t was not in issue that the appellant’s retainer required him to advise the respondent as to 
the merits of a claim against Dr Hastwell for negligence and for that purpose to take 
reasonable steps to ascertain full particulars of the treatment provided ... of the pain and 
suffering of the respondent by reason of that treatment, to investigate any other damage 
suffered by the respondent by reason of that treatment, and to obtain expert medical advice 
on any other breach of duty by Dr Hastwell.
13
  
 
In discharging this duty, the skill expected was that ‘of a qualified and ordinarily competent and 
careful solicitor in the exercise of his or her profession.’14  However, this only required the making 
of ‘reasonable enquiries in respect of the merits of the respondent’s claim.’15   Consequently, 
according to Newnes JA: 
the appellant was not obliged to embark upon speculative enquiries or to pursue lines of 
enquiry for which there was no apparent basis.  Nor was he required to pursue medical 
opinions until a favourable one was found.  Considerations of time, cost and utility dictate 
that enquiries cannot be unlimited.  A solicitor is entitled and, indeed bound, to use 
professional judgement in the lines of enquiry that are pursued.  The question is not what 
might have been found had more extensive enquiries been made, but whether the solicitor 
made reasonable enquiries in the circumstances ...
16
 
 
The Court also considered that an assessment of a claim’s reasonable prospects of success (for the 
purpose of determining whether the appellant negligently failed to advise the respondent that she 
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 3 
had a sustainable cause of action such that her action should have been kept alive), must be kept 
‘separate and distinct from [any] assessment of the value of [that] cause of action’ (for the purpose 
of awarding damages based on the chance that such a claim would have succeeded).
17
  
Nevertheless, ‘there could be no negligence in failing to advise a client to embark on litigation 
which was doomed, and nothing of value could be lost if such litigation were never commenced.’18  
‘It was never the respondent’s case that she had lost the chance of pursuing a case without 
reasonable prospects of success for the purposes of obtaining a settlement.’19   
 
The specific issues on appeal
20
 were then dealt with as follows: 
 
The appendectomy’s necessity & method of performance 
As elective surgery illustrates, treatment is not inappropriate simply because ‘it is not, or turns out 
not to have been, ‘necessary’ in the sense of being medically essential.’21 Therefore, ‘where a 
patient is suffering severe symptoms from an uncertain cause a surgical procedure that is not 
otherwise medically necessary may be appropriate in an attempt to relieve the symptoms, although 
it cannot be known with certainty whether the procedure will in fact have that effect.’22  Similarly, 
wrong diagnosis is not necessarily negligent.   
 
Accordingly, Newnes JA (McLure P and Murphy JA agreeing), considered that the issue ‘was not 
whether the appendectomy was ‘unnecessary,’23 but whether Dr Hastwell was negligent in 
diagnosing appendicitis and in advising’ that procedure.  Here the appellant was not negligent for 
failing to make enquiries into the merits of such a claim, as there was nothing in the information or 
the reports of the three medical experts, asked to advise on the appropriateness of the doctor’s 
treatment, which raised it as an issue.   There was also ‘no evidence that the respondent had been 
misled as to the manner in which the appendectomy would be performed,’24 or that the method used 
was inappropriate,
25
 such that a competent and careful solicitor could have advised that a claim for 
performing the surgery ‘by Pfannenstiel incision rather than by a laparoscopy had reasonable 
prospects of success.’26 
 
Failure to warn of risks & causation 
Their Honours agreed that reasonable care required the appellant to investigate a cause of action 
against Dr Hastwell for failing to warn of the material risks inherent in the appendectomy’s 
performance.
27
  However, at the time the action became statute-barred; such enquiries had not been 
made: 
It is clear that the appellant did not consider a case based on a failure to warn.  He did not 
ask the respondent whether she had received any warning about ... risk and he did not ask 
any of the medical experts he consulted about appropriate warnings.
28
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Had sufficient enquiries occurred, there was evidence reasonably available that the doctor had not 
advised the respondent ‘of any complications which might arise’ from the surgery, including the 
material and ‘increased risk of nerve pain involved in a Pfannenstiel incision.’29 
 
Nevertheless, the issue of ‘whether the appellant should have advised the respondent that she had 
reasonable prospects of making out a claim’30 on this ground was also contingent on her prospects 
of proving that the doctor’s failure to warn was a cause of her pain.  This required a court to be 
satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that firstly, ‘the Pfannenstiel incision was the cause of the 
pain, and secondly, that if warned the respondent would have declined to undergo the 
appendectomy by Pfannenstiel incision.’31  It was here that the opinion of the Court of Appeal 
diverged. 
 
Newnes JA (McLure P agreeing), held that there was insufficient evidence that the incision caused 
the respondent’s pain.  Rather, the cause ‘remained uncertain and unresolved’32 and ‘there was no 
evidence that any useful purpose would have been served by pursuing further enquiries.’33  As 
stated by McLure P: 
Having regard to the respondent’s pre-existing pain condition and complex medical history 
... The medical evidence goes no further than that nerve entrapment [due to the Pfannenstiel 
incision] might be one of a number of possible (alternative) ‘but for’ causes.  A real 
possibility is that any surgical intervention may have triggered the alleged alteration in the 
respondent’s pain state.34  
Furthermore, the test of causation (being subjective), requires consideration in determining liability 
of what the claimant would have done had the defendant not been negligent.  However, due to the 
potentially self-serving nature of such testimony,
35
 a claimant’s own evidence (if obtained),36 of 
what they would have done if warned, ‘would inevitably fall to be tested against relevant objective 
evidence.’37  Their Honours therefore considered that, on the evidence before the appellant,38 
objective factors such as the respondent’s:  
 trust and confidence in Dr Hastwell’s ability (given that he was not equipped to perform the 
procedure laparoscopically); and 
 desire for treatment to relieve her pain, 
when coupled with the remoteness of the risk of increased pain,
39
 indicated that it was also likely 
that, if warned, the respondent would have still proceeded with surgery via Pfannenstiel incision.  
 
Murphy JA dissented, and found that ‘the client had an arguable case on causation.’40  Although 
recognising the case as one ‘in which it could properly be concluded that difficult questions of fact 
would likely arise on causation, upon which different conclusions could fairly be open,’41 his 
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Honour held it ‘more probable than not that the Pfannenstiel incision performed by Dr Hastwell ... 
was a cause of, or materially contributed to, the client’s pain thereafter.’42  Furthermore, objective 
facts such as her risk aversion (given her level of preoperative pain), indicated that if properly 
warned the respondent ‘would not have consented to the surgery using a technique which involved 
a risk of nerve injury, and therefore additional pain.’43 
 
Lost opportunity or chance 
Due to their findings on causation, Newnes JA and McLure P concluded that whilst it was open to 
the primary judge to find that the respondent would have pursued a claim had she been advised that 
one was reasonably arguable,
44
 on the material reasonably available such advice could not be given.  
Therefore, ‘there was no breach of duty by the appellant in not advising the respondent to serve the 
writ or to apply to extend’ its validity.45  Conversely, Murphy JA (dissenting) held that ‘although a 
cause of action for failure to warn of a material risk, which became statute-barred, was not without 
its difficulties, it could not be said that it was hopeless, or doomed to fail.’46  As such, the 
appellant’s negligence had, on the balance of probabilities,47 caused the respondent to lose a 
‘chance of success in an action against Dr Hastwell’ of some, not negligible value.48 
 
Valuing the chance lost 
The Court agreed that as long as the notional damages likely to be awarded to the respondent upon a 
successful trial were reduced to properly allow for the uncertainty of outcome on breach and 
causation apparent on the facts and evidence available, ‘it was not significant’49 whether the 
percentage discount was calculated by taking into account, in a tiered manner, each element to be 
proved in turn,
50
 or by an overall determination of ‘the right percentage at which to establish the 
value of the claim.’51  Nevertheless, Murphy JA preferred the application of the latter global 
discount which accounted for all contingencies as a whole.
52
   
 
Difficulties often arise in determining the value of a client’s loss when their legal practitioner’s 
negligence deprives them of the opportunity to secure compensation.  ‘That is because the court 
must, in the professional negligence proceedings, necessarily engage in the speculative exercise of 
assessing the outcome of the original proceedings.’53  Consequently, this was confirmed in Nigam’s 
Case, by the Court of Appeal’s review of the primary judge’s damages award.  Whilst Newnes JA 
and McLure P held that ‘taking into account the respondent’s difficulties in respect of both 
negligence and causation, an assessment of the lost chance at 40% was much too high,’54 Murphy 
JA considered that although high, the 60% discount was not ‘outside the bounds of a proper 
award.’55 
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